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Th e Unbearable Lightness of Being … 
an Employee in Britain
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ABSTRACT
Th e aim of this paper is to discuss and analyse the impact of the new category of the 
employee shareholder within the context of the traditional theory of the contract of service 
and contract for services. A commentary on the provisions of the Growth and Infrastructure 
Act 2013 which heralded the introduction of the employee shareholder category will be 
provided in addition to a focus on the implied duties traditionally applied to personal 
employment contracts. One of the themes of the analysis is to assess whether and how these 
duties will apply to the future hybrid (and obscure) statutory construct of the ‘employee 
shareholder’. To provide a comparative analysis, this contribution will also briefl y examine 
whether any potential counterpart of the new British concept exists in Italian law.
Finally, the paper will discuss possible fl aws in the British legislation concerning employee 
shareholders, by taking an approach that is disarticulated from the traditional theory of 
employment law. One such issue concerns the systematic off er of shares and acceptance of 
the loss of employee status, which may render the EU law requirements of publication of a 
prospectus and communication of a redundancy plan to the trade unions redundant.
Keywords: Britain; comparison; employee shareholder; EU legislation; new rules
§1. INTRODUCTION
In modern times, the contract of service is the contractual framework ‘governing’ the 
interaction between master and servant, as opposed to the less formal contract for services 
existing between a worker and an employing entity. From a historical perspective, this 
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dichotomy is not an aliquid novi, for it is the legacy of its Roman law ‘ancestor’ and the 
concept of locatio operis, the latter being the conceptual antonym of the locatio operarum.1 
In British common law, the contract of service has been cultivated as a distinct category 
by the judiciary, through the elaboration of tests. Th ese aim to better defi ne, on the 
one hand, its salient features within the economic reality of the work environment,2, 3 
and on the other hand the divergences of the ‘dependent’ (or ‘subordinate’) from its 
correspondent ‘independent’ or ‘autonomous’ (the mere worker).4 Additionally and 
despite recent doctrinal elucidations and refl ections,5 the authorities have consistently 
stressed the theory of the existence of ‘an irreducible core of obligations in the contract of 
employment’.6 Th erefore, duties owed by the employee to the employer as a result of the 
characterization of a genus of contract as a ‘contract of service’ have been imposed by the 
common law, which in contrast, do not apply to other personal work relationships.
Furthermore, employment protection legislation has ‘sprouted’ around this concept, 
particularly in the previous fi ve decades. With the epistemological background of what 
is, particularly in the civil law jurisprudence, the eternal contrast between ius cogens 
and ius dispositivum,7 such statutory protection has introduced a heterogeneous series of 
irrevocable norms. Th ese provide the employee – one of the two parties to the contract 
of service – with a particular protected status to which a distinct set of privileges and 
prerogatives are attached.8 Among these rights, the most signifi cant, also because it is 
a principle widely recognized at international level,9 is undoubtedly the right not to be 
1 P. du Plessis, Borlowski’s Textbook on Roman Law (4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 277–279.
2 It is well known that the judicial paradigm of this test is Market Investigations Ltd v. Minister of Social 
Security [1969] 2 QB 173. See also judicially, as to the pure ‘control’ test, Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 
530, 532, 533. As far as agency workers are concerned and before the enactment of the Agency Workers 
Regulations 2010, see specifi cally James v. Greenwich London Borough Council [2008] IRLR 302.
3 M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, Th e Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p. 185. Namely, it is affi  rmed: ‘English law of contracts of employment has tended to be 
perceived as more specialized and distinctive as time has gone’.
4 D. Cabrelli, Employment law in Context (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 59–132; S. Deakin and G.S. 
Morris, Labour Law (6th edition, Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 155–171.
5 D. Brodie, ‘Fair Dealing and World of Work’, 1 ILJ (2014), p. 30–31. In this recent seminal contribution, 
it is argued that, ultimately, contracts of employment and those for services ‘have much in common, 
more in fact than they have apart’ and that ‘the traditional thinking [contract of service as opposed to 
contract for services] seems increasingly outdated as the common law is evolving to a position whereby 
contract for the provision of work are underpinned by shared rather than divergent values’.
6 S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law, p. 265.
7 Th erefore the imperative norms encompassed by the legislation and the ‘optional’ ones created by the 
courts. See O. Kahn-Freund, ‘A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law’, 80 MLR (1967), p. 641.
8 Ibid., p. 636.
9 See A. Perulli, ‘Fundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation and EU External Action’, 1 International
 Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2014), p. 27–48; and ILO Recommendation 
No. 119 of 1963 on the termination of employment. See A.C.L. Davies, Perspective on Labour Law (2nd 
edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 157–175.
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unfairly dismissed.10 However, at a more domestic level, the right to receive a redundancy 
payment upon the occurrence of the relevant conditions set forth under statute is also 
signifi cant.11
§2. THE NOVELTY OF THE EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDER
Yet, despite this consolidated trend, it now seems that the pillar of the contractual 
relationship at work is a ‘fortress under siege’. A recent piece of legislation in Britain, 
the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 (GIA 2013), to which Royal Assent was given 
on 25  April 2013 and which entered into force on 1  September 2013, ‘baptises’ and 
celebrates a new category, the ‘employee shareholder’. Apart from the technicalities of 
the new statute,12 prompted by the British coalition government within their ‘austerity 
programme’,13 Section 31(1) of the GIA 2013 seems to create from scratch an additional 
personal work contract or relationship (or a mere commercial one?!). Th e employee 
shareholder is an individual who receives fully paid up shares of the organization he 
10 In the ultimate legislative framework of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996), particularly 
section 94.
11 Also in this case, Employment Rights Act 1996, particularly section 135.
 Additional rights that the employee shareholder renounces, are, on the one hand, the request to 
undertake study or training (section 63D of the ERA 1996), and on the other hand, the request for 
fl exible working (section 80F of the ERA 1996).
 Conversely, the rights that the employee shareholder is still entitled to exercise, would be the following 
ones:
1. Statutory sick pay;
2. Statutory maternity, paternity and adoption leave and pay;
3. Unfair dismissal rights where they are classed as automatically unfair reasons;
4. Minimum notice periods if their employment will be ending;
5. Time off  for emergencies;
6. Collective redundancy consultation;
7. TUPE;
8. National Minimum Wage;
9. Not to have unlawful deduction from wages;
10. Paid annual leave;
11. Rest breaks;
12. Th e right not to be treated less favourably for working part time or fi xed term;
13. Not to be discriminated against.
 See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Guidance Employee Shareholders’, Website of the 
UK Government (2014), https://www.gov.uk/employee-shareholders.
12 Th e Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 is an extensive statute assembling multifarious law provisions 
ranging from the ‘use of infrastructure’ to the ‘the carrying-out of development and the compulsory 
acquisition of land’ as well as ‘rating lists (…) to be compiled’. Last in the order but not the least 
important for the purposes of this research, the ultimate statute in discussion comes up with provisions 
‘about the rights of employees of companies who agree to be employee shareholders’.
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belongs to, or its parent undertaking (in both cases, exclusively a company limited by 
shares), for an amount of no less than £ 2,000. Th is amount is exempt from capital 
gains tax up to a limit of £ 50,000. In return, the employee renounces signifi cant rights, 
particularly, but not exclusively, the fundamental right bestowed upon employees, the 
right not to be unfairly dismissed.
Th e individual, ‘who is or becomes an employee of a company’ acquires the status of 
‘employee shareholder’ through a simple agreement (section 205A(1)(a) of the amended 
Employee Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996)). Th e outcome of this agreement is the issue or 
allotment to the consenting employee of ‘fully paid up shares in the company’ (whether 
these fi nancial instruments have attached voting rights is not a mandatory prescription), 
as long as the shares ‘have a value on the day of issue or allotment of no less than £ 
2,000’ (section 205(1)(b) of the ERA 1996). A corollary of this datio of shares is the 
consignment to the individual of a ‘written statement of the particulars of the status of 
employee shareholder’ (following section 205A(1)(c) of the ERA 1996). Th e agreement 
therefore shall not be legally enforceable until the employee has received a written list of 
particulars following advice with regard to the contract of which the company will bear 
‘reasonable’ cost.14 More specifi cally, according to section 31(6) of the GIA 2013:
Agreement between a company and an individual that the individual is to become an employee 
shareholder is of no eff ect unless, before the agreement is made –
(a) the individual, having been given the statement referred to in subsection (1)(c), receives 
advice from a relevant independent adviser as to the terms and eff ect of the proposed 
agreement,
 and
(b) seven days have passed since the day on which the individual receives the advice.
Arguably, it is not specifi ed in the GIA 2013 whether this advice shall be qualifi ed (for 
example given by a lawyer or a trade union). Th e tenor of the legislation and the adjective 
‘independent’ seem to suggest that, the advice, as long as it is given by an entity and/or 
person separate or unrelated to the employer, shall be regarded as valid. However, the 
British government has made an attempt to clarify the otherwise misleading terminology 
and suggested that (exclusively) a qualifi ed lawyer, certifi ed trade union offi  cial, advice 
centre worker or any other person authorized to give legal advice by the Secretary of 
State may fi t into the category of eligible advisor for purposes of the GIA 2013.15
Th e following section 205A(7) of the ERA 1996 highlights the costs of this advice: 
‘Any reasonable costs incurred by the individual in obtaining the advice (whether or not 
14 Section 31(7) of the GIA 2013.
15 Th e only exclusion relates to in-house lawyers or lawyers who acted for the company. See Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Guidance Employee Shareholders’, Website of the UK Government 
(2014), https://www.gov.uk/employee-shareholders.
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the individual becomes an employee shareholder) which would, but for this subsection, 
have to be met by the individual are instead to be met by the company’.
Th e consignment of the shares shall be gratuitous according to law as the ‘individual 
gives no consideration other than by entering into the agreement’ (section 205A(1)(d) of 
the ERA).
§3. THE EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDER AND THE COMMON 
LAW IMPLICATIONS
Beyond the ‘black letter’ of the new legislation, the employee shareholder categorization 
engenders a number of more wide-ranging and philosophical considerations. Th ere is 
limited existing academic literature on the employer shareholder category,16 but some 
legal considerations are brought to light by an initial cogitation on the new typology at 
stake.
A. THE BLEND OF EMPLOYEE AND SHAREHOLDER
First and foremost, the composite terminology shaped by the United Kingdom legislature 
(by merging employee and shareholder) would seem to be an ‘awkward’ alignment of 
two otherwise contradictory characters – on the one hand the employee17 and, on the 
other hand, the shareholder.18 Th e former represents the traditional ‘dependent’, whose 
contract of service fi rmly ties him to his employer who, in turn, is bestowed with the ‘power 
of direction and control’.19 Th e shareholder is merely a member of a company owning 
a holding in its share capital. Th e merging of the two, then, results in an unnaturally 
and artifi cially unifi ed oxymoron. From an ontological point of view, it is interesting 
therefore to dwell on the implications of this ‘forced marriage’ between employment 
law and company law, and how the ‘off spring’ of this uncomfortable relationship – the 
employee shareholder – will come to be regarded in the universe of the ‘world of work’.
16 Th e only contributions to date are those of a scholar: J. Prassl, ‘Employee Shareholder “Status”: 
Dismantling the Contract of Employment’, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 307. As far as the general theory of the stock-
ownership plans is concerned, tangentially and within the broader discussion of a textbook, see also G. 
Pitt, Employment Law (9th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), p. 103–104. It is passionately affi  rmed that it 
seems ‘extraordinarily crass to implement a measure [the employee shareholder] allowing employment 
protection rights to be bought out in this way, and entirely contrary to the whole thrust of protective 
legislation in the past which has always contained strong anti-avoidance measures’. Additionally, it is 
highlighted that the ‘price [swap] is insultingly low (and the share value will, of course, fl uctuate and 
could go down substantially) and the employee shareholders may fi nd themselves a disadvantaged class 
compared with other shareholders’.
17 On the philosophical category of the dependent, see S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law, p. 145–171.
18 On the ontology of the shareholders as ‘members’, see P. Davies, Clarendon Law Series Introduction to 
Company Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2010).
19 S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law, p. 145.
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As a preliminary foray into the mechanics of the relationship, a hypothesis can 
be put forward that the new category is a hybrid merely in its nomen juris and the 
way its astute law-maker semantically has encapsulated the dependent in the relevant 
classifi cation (the ‘employee shareholder’). However, beyond the facade of this enticing, 
but at the same time ineff able defi nition, a consideration of the multitude of rights 
that the employee must surrender in adhering to the proposal of his employer20 would 
suggest a radical metamorphosis of the individual is underway. In other words it would 
appear that the privileged position of employee is under threat to what might be, de 
facto and despite the linguistic camoufl age,21 the less auspicious rank of ‘member’.22 Th e 
hypothesis is that the GIA 2013, with its creation of this new category,23 is attempting 
to covertly extract the employee from the employment law Weltanschauung and to 
transmute him, by adopting a decidedly dubious legislative technique, into the sphere 
of commercial law.24
20 Section 205A(2) of the amended Employment Rights Act 1996, as detailed by J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), 
p. 313.
21 Nonetheless, the new section 205A(3) ERA 1996 does not deprive the new category of some rights usually 
conferred on employees, such as maternity, parental or adoption leave, though in the new version they 
are subject to a longer period (see also previous footnote 11). Are these remaining rights still enough 
to allow the characterization of the employee shareholder as employee or worker? Instinctively, the 
status-specifi c elements of statutory protection that remain in place inform the nature of the employee 
shareholder category, which in turn assists the interpreter in identifying the common law implied 
duties that shall apply or not apply to that new category. For an analysis of the state-of-the-art of the 
family friendly policies in Britain, see S. Honeyball, Honeyball & Bowers’ Textbook on Employment 
Law (12th edition, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 298–305; G. Pitt, Employment Law (8th edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 175–206; and, more recently, G. Pitt, Employment Law (9th edition Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 189–222. As regards the EU dimension, see C. Barnard, EU Employment Law 
(4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 401–453.
22 In this respect, if this hypothesis was corroborated, the most recent view – i.e. the employee shareholder 
regarded as ‘worker’ (J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 329) – would result in not being totally convincing. Th is 
scholar authoritatively affi  rms that employee shareholders ‘are left  with nothing more than the basic 
protection available to all workers’. However, the departure from both the genus ‘contract of service’ 
and the ‘contract for services’ could be inferred not simply from the substance of the relationship 
(the employee shareholder as a mere member of the company) but also from the legislative technique 
utilized by the British law maker. To elaborate this second point, the new provisions are not inserted 
within the sedes materiae dedicated to the worker (section 230 of the ERA 1996), rather within the 
diff erent context of section 205 ERA 1996 under the heading ‘Contracting out etc. and Remedies’.
23 From a company law perspective and partly beyond the scope of the research, questions would arise as 
to whether the GIA 2013 has created – in an eccentric way – a new type of shareholder, generated outside 
the British company law framework. As regards the types of shares under the current Companies Act 
2006, see D. French, S. Mayson and C. Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (29th edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 170–171.
 Additionally, the way fully paid up shares shall be issued to the benefi t of the employee shareholder 
and the several legal concerns originating therefrom have already been highlighted among scholars. J. 
Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 319–320.
24 In other jurisdictions, such as the Italian, a specifi c category of employee shareholder has been codifi ed 
for decades in the Italian Civil Code (ICC) within the chapter dedicated to the companies limited by 
shares and categories of shareholders (Article 2349). See below Section 5.
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B. THE EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDER AND THE IMPACT ON HIS 
COMMON LAW DUTIES
Additionally, the new category of ‘employee shareholder’ gives rise to a number of, 
as of yet, unanswered, but terribly intriguing, questions concerning whether or not 
the implied terms of the personal work or employment contracts and the ‘guiding 
principles’ underpinning them25 are applicable to this new concept. To elaborate, if the 
employee shareholder surrenders his status as party to a contract of service26 it is not 
immediately obvious, partly due to the ambiguous nature of the new legislation, how 
the common law will ‘react’ in response to the traditional categories of duties implied 
in broader work contracts.27 Instinctively it would not seem overly speculative to 
anticipate that as the employee shareholder is no longer dependent, the case law shall 
henceforth oversee a micro-system of implied duties. In doing so, the adjudicators will 
seemingly rely on either the general theory of commercial contracts28 as opposed to 
the employment contract, or on both forms of contracts. A reference to both contracts 
may be justifi ed both by the fact that the employee shareholder liaison is semantically 
endowed with a ‘mixed fl avour’ (both the personal work and the mercantile risk) and the 
recently emphasized trend of an increasing convergence of the laws of commercial and 
employment contracts.29 Nevertheless, if the common law corroborated the hypothesis 
that the employee shareholder, in his real legal characterization, is a pure shareholder30 
and his status ontologically belongs more readily to the law of merchants rather than 
the discipline of master and servant, intriguingly the myriad duties which would apply 
to him would be more coherently extracted from the common law of commercial 
contracts.31
25 M. Freedland, Th e Personal Employment Contract (Oxford Monograph on Labour Law, 2006), p. 113–
195.
26 J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 329. It is affi  rmed with clarity: ‘Th e new category thus erodes nearly all status-
specifi c elements of protection attached to the core employment relationship: in denying the traditional 
trade-off  between control and protection it represents a complete departure from existing approaches 
to the determination of employee status’.
27 At the institutional level, for a summary of these duties, see: D. Cabrelli, Employment law in Context, 
p. 137–212; H. Collins, K.D. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
p. 131–157.
28 As regards the duties owed by the agent to the principal, see L.S. Sealy and R.J.A. Hooley, Commercial 
Law Text, Cases and Materials (4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2009), p.  202–231; for the 
corresponding Scottish discipline, see F. Davidson and L.J. MacGregor, Commercial Law in Scotland 
(2nd edition, Th omson/W. Green, 2008), p. 68–72.
29 D. Brodie, 1 ILJ (2014), p. 51.
30 Or, at least, not an employee.
31 Th is potential issue of friction between common law duties implied to a contract of service and the 
new category of employee shareholder has already been raised by scholars, in respect of, on the one 
hand, duty of care in the way the employee is dismissed and, on the other hand, the statutory unfair 
dismissal. See J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 317–318.
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C. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMON LAW
Although it might be quite pretentious to predict the future case law, within the context 
of this article it is nonetheless possible to gauge with a certain degree of approximation 
the prospective doctrinal developments in the area of the duties entailed to the employee 
shareholder relationship.
In the common laws of Britain, jurists have long been fostering an epistemological 
approach to the implied terms in fact, mainly based on the combination of the two tests of 
the ‘business effi  cacy’ and the ‘offi  cious bystander’.32 In brief, implied terms of the contract 
are those which are ‘necessary in the business sense to give effi  cacy to the contract’,33 but also 
those which are so obvious that, if an offi  cious bystander would suggest it to the contracting 
parties, the latter would have the terms included in the contract without hesitation.34
On such a footing, the actual outcome of the doctrinal exegesis could be two-fold: 
(i) amongst the various implied duties connected with the contract of service, there are 
several that will no longer apply to the employee shareholder as they are conceptually 
inconsistent with this new category; (ii) for the remaining duties still applicable to 
the genus, it is essential to assess how they will be construed in future in respect to an 
individual who has acquired the status of employee shareholder.
As far as the fi rst interpretation is concerned, the employee shareholder, distinct 
from the employee shall, in all likelihood, not be bound by the obligation of fi delity.35 
Th e basis for this conclusion would appear to rest on conceptual and logical grounds: 
the employee shareholder does play, as a result of the metamorphosis of his contract 
of service, a role which is partly mercantile. He is, to a certain degree, a businessman 
and like any entrepreneur, shall be immune to ties of exclusivity with any employer, 
including the employing entity with which, initially, a contract of service subsisted. Th is 
outcome, philosophically incontrovertible, would appear to withstand the common law 
angle of observation: the duty of fi delity is historically imposed on employees who, due 
to their rank in the employer’s organization, are categorized as fi duciaries.36 Conversely, 
the GIA 2013 – which does not expressly take a position on the rank required for an 
employee to become an employee shareholder37 – seems to be disarticulated from any 
role of fi duciary of the employee shareholder.
32 Doctrinally (D. Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context, p. 156), it is emphasized that an implied term in 
fact ‘is not of universal application to contracts of a particular class or type, but specifi c to the contract 
at hand between the relevant contracting parties. (…) Th e justifi cation for inserting implied terms in 
fact into the contract for the parties is that they refl ect the presumed intention of the parties or are 
identifi able for reference to customs of the trade or the workplace’.
33 Th e Moorcock (1889) LR PD 64; Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. Ltd [1918] 1 KB 892.
34 Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206.
35 See, among the diff erent British dicta, Sinclair v. Neighbour [1967] 2 QB 279.
36 At judicial level, the paradigm of this is Nottingham University v. Fishel [2000] IRLR 471. Doctrinally, 
see S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law, p. 372.
37 Although there is a lack of literature on this point, it may be affi  rmed that the new fi gure is theoretically 
extended to the entire workforce.
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Th e duty of obedience may be a further ‘casualty’: the employee shareholder’s 
sacrosanct obligation to comply with the lawful instructions of the employer38 is a 
natural element of the contract of employment and ‘was accompanied by the master’s 
right to discipline and perhaps chastise the erring servant’.39 In assessing the work 
relationship between employee shareholder and employer where the employee is not 
entitled to claim unfair dismissal, this duty would seem to be inconsistent, or at least 
dubious in its ratio essendi. Furthermore, the reciprocal duty of care40 may constitute 
an additional ‘litmus test’ of this form of epistemological procedure: the solution of 
the predicament (that is, whether or not the duty applies to the employee shareholder 
relationship with an employer) would seem to be acutely signifi cant and strategic, 
particularly in regard to its impact on specifi c concepts such as vicarious liability. If 
there was a corroboration of the hypothesis that the employee shareholder is nominally 
an employee, but de facto a worker, any vicarious liability on the part of the employer for 
his conduct would certainly be ruled out.
Th e second possible methodology is more concerned with probing, for each duty, 
the level of performance expected of the employee shareholder in comparison with 
that expected of the pure employee. Instinctively, this threshold of performance, for an 
employee shareholder, would not be set as high and demanding as the one set for an 
employee. In following this line of reasoning, the potential for the employee shareholder 
to be held in breach of his contract will be statistically dwarfed by that theoretically 
conceivable for an employee: the parameters of assessment of the duties of an employee 
are conceived in a work environment where the individual constitutes an integral part 
of the employer’s organization, whereas the employee shareholder would appear to be a 
hybrid fi gure who, as a result of the conversion of his contract, has undertaken a mix of 
personal work and business risk.
Ultimately, given the signifi cant degree of uncertainty left  by the United Kingdom 
legislator in this area, a jurist will feel fully entitled to raise a concern about the way in 
which the duties of the employee shareholder have been draft ed (or rather, have not been 
draft ed) in the relevant piece of legislation. Clearly, the statute has defi ned, in respect to 
the employee shareholder, the rights which he will relinquish and those that, conversely, 
he will retain, as a result of accepting the employer’s off er. However, the legislator has 
not touched on the list of obligations this new category of worker will be obligated to 
discharge. In all likelihood, given the ground-breaking (and fl awed, according to the 
sceptical ones) nature of the construct,41 a ‘civil law’ weapon could have been brandished 
in Britain – namely, an elaboration under legislation of the ambit of obligations and 
38 Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 698.
39 I. Smith and A. Baker, Smith & Wood’s employment Law (11th edition, OUP 2013), p. 163.
40 At common law, see Harmer v. Cornelius (1858) 5 CBNS 236 or, more recently, Cheltenham BC v. Laird 
[2009] IRLR 621.
41 Th e legal concept of employee shareholder is disarticulated from the conventional common law 
experience and the traditional ‘chasm’ between the contract of service and the contract for services.
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duties by which the employee shareholder is bound. An elucidation of the duties would 
not have constituted a blasphemous transplant of legal concepts belonging to various 
legal traditions; rather, it would constitute the mere alignment of a missing feature of the 
new legislation (the duties of the new legislative category) to the new corpus legis (that is, 
the GIA 2013).42 If this has not culpably transpired, it is in all likelihood once again due 
to that entrenched ‘pachydermatous cornucopia of self-esteem that is the life style of the 
English common law’.43
§4. THE NEW CATEGORY AND ‘LEGISLATIVE PUZZLES’
In terms of an exegesis of the legal provisions at stake, due to the magnitude of the issues 
emerging from the new category, it would be safe to assume that amendments to the GIA 
2013 – correctly defi ned an unfortunate statute44 – will quickly materialize.
A. EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDER AND PROSPECTUS
Based on legislation recently introduced in Britain the employer is free to off er the 
proposal of ‘conversion’ of the contract of service to a signifi cant number of his employees. 
In actual terms, this would be tantamount to a public off er of securities (the shares) to a 
body of investors.
Indeed, EU legislation has already set forth principles requiring the issuer (and/
or, cumulatively, the off eror) to inform the off erees of the characteristics of both the 
securities off ered and the issuer itself. Th is requirement is manifested upon the approval 
and publication of a document (the prospectus),45 the purpose of which is to safeguard 
the investor.46 Although it would be too speculative to defi ne the employer as a pure 
fi nancier off ering securities, it would be fair to suggest that the ‘employee-shareholder’ 
category recently created by British legislation was deserving of a better and more holistic 
approach, in terms of protection of the weak party. To elaborate, in the recently conceived 
42 About the concept of transplant in the comparative law analysis, see J.H. Merryman, Th e Loneliness of 
the Comparative Lawyer (Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 17–49.
43 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Inderogability, Collective Agreements, and Community Law’, 4 ILJ (1992), p. 250. 
Th e expression, not connected with the topic in discussion, is nonetheless imaginary and persuasive.
44 A ‘fl awed legislation’, to use the most explicit defi nition of one of the fi rst scholars who authoritatively 
commented on it; J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 307–337, particularly p. 337.
45 Reference is made to Directive 2003/71/EC (Prospectus Directive), concerned with the ‘prospectus to 
be published when securities are off ered to the public or admitted to trading’, Directive 2003/71/EC 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are off ered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, [2003] OJ L345/64.
46 See Recital 16 of Directive 2003/71/EC which is self-explanatory. It is also added in Recital 19: 
‘Investment in securities, like any other form of investment, involves risk. Safeguards for the protection 
of the interests of actual and potential investors are required in all Member States in order to enable them 
to make an informed assessment of such risks and thus to take investment in full knowledge of the facts’.
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employee shareholder category, the employee would appear to be the benefi ciary of a 
proposal to receive shares (like any investor) and to become de facto an entrepreneur. 
Undeniably, according to the GIA 2013, the company off ering the ‘employee shareholder 
status’ shall provide the individual with ‘a written statement of the particulars of the status 
of employee shareholder and of the rights which attach to the shares’ off ered (section 205A 
of the ERA 1996, as modifi ed by the GIA 2013).47 However, what the ‘particulars’ at stake 
fail to mention is an appropriate description of both the business and fi nancial accounts 
of the employer off ering its securities. In the discipline of fi nancial law, this is a typical 
requirement imposed on the issuer, particularly in cases where shares (equity securities by 
defi nition) are off ered, so that an adequate illustration of the issuer’s fi nancial statements 
and future perspective of the market can be provided to the potential off eree.
For the purposes of integrity however, it must be acknowledged that the Prospectus 
Directive does contemplate within its provisions a range of off ers that, albeit within the 
scope of that legislation, do not trigger any obligation of a prospectus (remarkably, in 
this respect, an off er of securities addressed to fewer than 150 natural or legal persons 
for each EU country where the off er takes place)48 or are entirely exempt.49 However, 
in the case under discussion, the off er of securities put forward by the employer would 
not simply to one employee shareholder but theoretically to the entire workforce50 seem 
47 Among these details, some are certainly of ‘corporate nature’, such as those spelled out under section 
205A(5) ERA 1996, particularly (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j). For example, emphasis can be placed on 
the ‘statement’ (section 205A(5)(f) ERA 1996) specifying whether ‘the company has more than one 
class of shares (…)’ or that (section 205A(5)(h) ERA 1996) relating to the circumstance that ‘there are 
restrictions on the transferability of the employee shares and, if there are, what those restrictions are’. 
For an analysis of the Prospectus Directive from a British perspective, see A. Hudson, Hudson Th e Law 
of Finance (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), p. 1055–1060. From a more international perspective, 
see P. Schammo, EU Prospectus Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
48 More specifi cally, Article  3 of Directive 2003/71/EC mentions cases of lack of applicability of the 
‘obligation to publish a prospectus’, in cases of ‘an off er of securities addressed solely to qualifi ed 
investors’, ‘an off er of securities addressed to fewer than 150 natural or legal persons per Member State, 
other than qualifi ed investors’, ‘an off er of securities addressed to investors who acquire securities for a 
total consideration’ of at least € 100,000 ‘per investor for each separate off er’, ‘an off er of securities whose 
denomination per unit amounts’ to at least € 100,000, ‘an off er of securities with a total consideration of 
less than’ € 100,000 ‘which limit shall be calculated over a period of 12 months’.
 It is worth noting that the Prospectus Directive has been partly amended by Directive 2010/73/EC 
amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are off ered to the 
public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
[2010] OJ L327/1.
49 Th e exemption seems to be even more pertinent. Article 4 of Directive 2003/71/EC exempts from the 
obligation to publish a prospectus, among the others, for ‘securities off ered, allotted or to be allotted 
to existing or former directors or employees by their employer which has securities already admitted 
to trading or a regulated market or by an affi  liated undertaking, provided that a document is made 
available containing information on the number and nature of the securities and the reasons for and 
details of the off er’.
50 A workforce of more than 100 employees may not be uncommon in enterprises and businesses; therefore, 
an extensive off er of shares to employees for them to become shareholders is not a mere theoretical scenario.
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consistent with the rule (and thus fall within the scope of the Prospectus Directive) 
rather than being an exception to it.
B. EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDER AND THE ‘CONSULTATION PROCESS’
To reinforce the criticism spelled out in the previous paragraph, it is worth noting 
that the British legislator, in introducing this new category, ought to have prescribed 
a consultation process with the trade unions in order to adequately communicate, 
in terms of consequences for the business and future prospects, a plan of ‘multiple’ 
off er to the workforce of employee shareholder ‘statuses’.51 In this respect, the 
new British statute could also contravene the relevant EU directives (nonetheless 
implemented in the UK), namely the Directives on Collective Redundancies and 
Transfer of Undertakings52 and, even more blatantly, the Directive on Information 
and Consultation of Employees.53 In a more practical scenario, the proposal of serial 
conversions of contracts of services in hybrid employee-shareholder relationships may 
camoufl age systematic plans of redundancy or worse, orchestrated unfair dismissals 
of the workforce, with the trade unions being circumvented or entirely omitted from 
the process.54
51 A diff erent view is advocated by some scholars (M. Biasi, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Worker Participation. 
Diff erent Forms for Diff erent Goals of Employee Involvement’, 30 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law & Industrial Relations (2014); this author maintains that the employee shareholder could 
be in reality a British way to comply with the Directive on information and consultation. Although the 
employee shareholder is a concept that formally originates from the GIA Bill, it is not too speculative 
to cogitate on a subtle connection between this novel notion and the compensated no fault dismissal 
mentioned in the Beecroft  Report (A. Beecroft , ‘Report on Employment Law’, Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/employment-law-review-
report-beecroft ).
52 Council Directive 77/187/EEC, revised by Directive 98/50/EC and subsequently consolidated in 
Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding 
of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings 
or businesses, [2001] OJ L 82/16. Th is EU statute has been transplanted in the UK within the latest 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006. For a general consideration 
of the relevant discipline, see C. Barnard, EU Employment Law, p. 657–698.
53 Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in 
the European Community, [2002] OJ L 80, or, more colloquially, ‘Directive on National Information 
and Consultation’, (C. Barnard, EU Employment Law, p. 685–691). Th is piece of legislation, which, as 
far as the UK is concerned, has been implemented by the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004, encourages workers and employers to strike deals on the kind of participation that 
the employees must be allowed in the work place. D. Cabrelli, Employment Law in Context, p. 777–816.
54 Th e perplexities are not clarifi ed by the fi rm and ostentatious statement of the British Government 
according to which the employee shareholder retains, among his rights, the collective redundancy 
consultation (see Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Guidance Employee Shareholders’, 
Website of the UK Government (2014), https://www.gov.uk/employee-shareholders).
 Doctrinally, this area ‘of considerable uncertainty’ has been emphasized by J. Prassl, 4 ILJ (2013), p. 318–
319. Namely, this author correctly observes: ‘Whilst the BIS Guidance lists Collective Redundancy 
consultation and TUPE, trade union rights as such appear to be excluded’.
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§5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: ITALY 
AND ITS PARTICIPATION
From a comparative law perspective, forms of so-called cooperation between employers 
and employees already exist in other jurisdictions. Italy – a comparator for purposes of 
this analysis – already caters for a special category of ‘shares and fi nancial instruments in 
favour of employees’.55 Th e issue of securities of this typology requires an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting of the company so that ‘the distribution of profi ts to employees of 
companies or their subsidiaries’56 can be resolved. Th e mechanism provided is the issue 
of a special category of shares to be assigned individually to employees, ‘for an amount 
corresponding to the said profi ts’.57 Remarkably, the Italian Civil Code (ICC), in which 
the disposition at stake is enshrined, has been promulgated in an era (1942) where the 
statutory rights in favour of employees were far from being codifi ed. Yet, the insertion, 
within the corpus iuris of the Italian company law, of the category of special shares for 
employees is not accompanied by any employee waiver of rights bestowed upon him. 
In other words, in Italy the participation of the employee has never been regarded as 
an alternative to the employee status (as the British legislator seems to have done more 
recently), but rather as cumulative.58
In the same jurisdiction, from a mere labour law perspective, more recently and 
under the aegis of an Italian government,59 the Italian Reform on Labour Market60 has 
attempted to implement, in accordance with the Article 46 of the Italian Constitution,61 
a form of co-participation of employees in the management of the company. However, 
apart from the legal technicality,62 the purposes and aims of this statute signifi cantly 
55 Article 2349 of the ICC. See, among scholars, G. Zilio Grandi, ‘Art. 2349 ICC’, in R. De Luca Tamajo 
and O. Mazzotta (eds.), Commentario Breve alle Leggi sul Lavoro (CEDAM, 2013), p. 654.
56 Th e same Article 2349 of the ICC.
57 See specifi cally R. Caragnano, Il Codice della Partecipazione (Giuff re’ Editore, 2010); R. Caragnano, ‘La 
Partecipazione dei Lavoratori: Prima Analisi delle Recenti Proposte di Legge’, Working Papers Adapt 
86 (2009), www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/fi les/document/4576WP_09_86.pdf.
 More generally, A. Vallebona, Breviario di Diritto del Lavoro (8th edition, Giappichelli Editore, 2013), 
p. 314, 315; M. Persiani et al., Fondamenti di Diritto del Lavoro (CEDAM, 2013), p. 132–133.
58 As the concept merely relates to the remuneration, the shareholder employee will be able to take part 
in the scheme by receiving part of his wage through the profi t. See F. Carinci et al. (eds.), Diritto del 
Lavoro, 2. Il Lavoro Subordinato (Giuff re’ Editore, 2011), p. 268.
59 Clearly, reference is made to the ‘bureaucratic’ Monti Cabinet, in charge of the stewardship of that 
country from 16 November 2011 until 28 April 2013.
60 Law no 92 of 28 June 2012 (the Fornero Act).
61 Namely: ‘For purposes of bettering off  labour both economically and socially and coherently with the 
industrial needs, the Republic [of Italy] acknowledges the rights of workers to cooperate, within the 
forms and limitations set forth under statute, in the management of companies’ (our translation).
 See M. Papaleoni, ‘Art. 46 Cost.’, in R. De Luca Tamajo and O. Mazzotta (eds.), Commentario Breve alle 
Leggi sul Lavoro (CEDAM, 2013), p. 121.
62 In a country such as Italy whether the contractual agreement is endowed with quasi-legislative eff ects, 
the implementation of the new provisions shall occur through collective agreements at plant level. M. 
Biasi, 30 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law & Industrial Relations (2014).
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diff er from those permeating the British legislation and, specifi cally, the GIA 2013. More 
specifi cally, on the one hand, no employee has been deprived of any right, particularly the 
right not to be unfairly dismissed; on the other hand, the implementation of the relevant 
benefi ts has been envisaged through delegated legislation (by government decree).
More generally, it is worth noting that the diff erent forms of involvement of employees 
contemplated under Article  4(62) of the Fornero Act63 refer, among the others, to 
information and consultation duties in favour of employees or their representatives 
(Article  4(62)(a) of the Fornero Act) and, particularly, the appointment of employee 
representatives in the supervisory boards of companies employing more than 300 people 
(Article 4(62)(f) of the Fornero Act).64
Ultimately, the recent ‘Italian job’ seems to be more consistent and rational than the 
nearly contemporaneous British counterpart, as it does not ‘mess up’ the variety of rights 
bestowed at statutory level upon employees. Additionally, it seems to be more consistent 
with the ostensive purpose of the supporting legislation, as it does not simply arrange 
for a fi nancial participation (the shares) but also for an active management involvement 
of the employees (the employees being duly represented in the management structure of 
the employer).
§6. CONCLUSION
At European Union level, there is an increasing movement towards the creation of 
frameworks of ‘workers participation’. Th e British ‘employee shareholder’, far from being 
the answer to that question, may be in reality a peculiar attempt from across the Channel 
to erase the employee from the workplace. It is apparent and incontrovertible that the 
legislation on the employee shareholder in Britain signals the end of the values that have 
been permeating the contract of service since as early as the 1960s: the power of the 
employer compensated by the guarantee of the basic protections of the employee.65 Th e 
former still remains, as a result of the latest legislative developments; conversely, the 
latter slowly but inexorably fades away, and the employee loses the public regulatory 
benefi ts of the contract of service. It is arduous not to imagine that the case law shall 
remain insensitive to these changes when required to investigate on the implied duties 
that shall be applied to the employee shareholder.
Th e contribution has referred to the possible fl aws connected with the way the new 
category has made its debut in Britain, as well as the apparent inconsistencies with pieces 
of legislation of cognate areas of law, at both national and supranational level (in this 
63 Law No. 92 of 28 June 2012.
64 For a commentary to the Italian Law No. 92/2012, M. Biasi, 30 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law & Industrial Relations (2014).
65 A. Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 10.
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respect, the brief comparison with Italy in this contribution is telling). Additionally, the 
paper has hinted at the potential conundrum that the common law will seemingly face in 
future, in dealing with the traditional duties implied to the contract of service and, more 
specifi cally, if and how they will continue to apply to the employee shareholder.
Ultimately, this article raises the concern that, with the entitlement recently bestowed 
on the employer to demand that the employee becomes an ‘employee shareholder’ and 
the resulting loss of the prerogatives of the employee main rights (for example not to be 
unfairly dismissed), acceptance by the employee would render the contract of service 
in Britain a residual contractual relationship, rather than the centre of the employer-
employee relationship. In the same fashion, the word ‘employee’, if construed within this 
new scenario and if such a trend was consolidated, will progressively lose its evocative 
substance: the status, and will revert to its origins, the employee as a mere party to a 
personal work relationship, with limited or non-existent protection of a legislative nature.
